CHARLES DEGAULLE SUPPORTS BIAFRA [Remarks made at a press
conference, Paris, on 9 September 1968. (Text by courtesy of the French
Embassy, London.) From: Kirk-Greene, vol.2, p. 329]
This is a statement made by the President of France, Charles
DeGaulle, at a press conference. He gave a speech in this same year endorsing
the idea that the province of Quebec could/should secede from the nation of
Canada.
What is his view of the situation in Biafra?
What does he think should happen there?
What action does he refuse to take with regard to Biafra?
Why?
President De Gaulle's exchange with a reporter:
Question: The drama taking place in Biafra seems to grow
more tragic every day. You have alluded several times to the Biafran problem.
Mr. President, could you give us your point of view on this problem?
De Gaulle: I am not sure that the system of federation,
which sometimes, in certain parts and from a certain angle replaces that of colonization,
is always a very good and very practical system, particularly in Africa. But
not only in Africa, for in fact it consists in arbitrarily joining together
peoples who are sometimes very different or even opposed to each other and who,
therefore, have no desire whatever to be joined.
We see this in Canada, in Rhodesia, in Malaysia, in Cyprus,
and we see it in Nigeria. Indeed, why should the Ibos, who are generally
Christians, who live in the south in a certain way, who have their own language,
why should they depend on another ethnic fraction of the Federation? Since this
is what one ends up with once the colonizer has withdrawn his authority. In an artificial
federation, one ethnic element imposes its authority on the others.
Even before the present drama in Biafra, one could wonder
how Nigeria would be able to live, in view of all the crises the Federation was
experiencing. And now that this appalling, enormous drama has occurred, now
that Biafra has proclaimed its independence and that, to subdue it, the
Federation is resorting to war, blockade, extermination and famine, how can it
be imagined that the peoples of the Federation, Ibos included, can resume life
together? France, in this affair, has done what was possible to help Biafra.
She has not performed the act which, to her, would be
decisive, of recognizing the Biafran Republic, because she regards the
gestation of Africa as a matter for the Africans first and foremost. Already,
in fact, some States of Eastern and Western Africa have recognized Biafra.
Others appear to be moving in that direction. This means
that, where France is concerned, the decision which has not been taken is not
ruled out for the future. And indeed, one can imagine that the Federation
itself, recognizing the impossibility of keeping on its present organization,
may turn itself into some kind of union or confederation that would reconcile
Biafra's right to self-determination with continuing ties between it and the
whole of Nigeria.
Charles de Gaullev Primary Sources vCharles de Gaulle was
born in Lille, France, on 22nd November, 1890. The son of a headmaster of a
Jesuit school, he was educated in Paris. He was a good student and at the
Military Academy St. Cyr, he graduated 13th in the class of 1912. Commissioned
as a second lieutenant, the 6 feet 5 tall de Gaulle joined an infantry regiment
commanded by Colonel Henri-Philippe Petain in 1913.
In the First World War de Gaulle was wounded twice in the
first few months of the conflict. Promoted to the rank of captain in February,
1915, de Gaulle fought at Verdun where he was wounded again and on 2nd
March, 1916 was captured by the German Army. Over the next 32 months he was
held in several prisoner of war camps and made five unsuccessful attempts to
escape.
After the Armistice de Gaulle was assigned to a Polish
division being formed in France where he served under Maxime Weygand. He fought
against the Red Army during the Civil War and won Poland's highest military
decoration, Virtuti Militari. De Gaulle lectured at the French War College
where he worked closely with Henri-Philippe Petain.
Over the next few years the two men demanding a small,
mobile, highly mechanized army of professionals. De Gaulle's military ideas appeared
in his book, The Army of the Future (1934). In the book he also criticized the
static theories of war that was exemplified by the Maginot Line. The book was
unpopular with the politicians and the military who favoured the idea of a mass
army of conscripts during war. In 1936 de Gaulle was punished for his views by
having his name taken of the promotion list.
In 1938 de Gaulle published France and Her Army. This book
caused a disagreement with Henri-Philippe Petain who accused de Gaulle of taking
credit for work done by the staff of the French War College.
On the outbreak of the Second World War de Gaulle took over
command of the 5th Army's tank force in Alsace. He soon became frustrated with
the military hierarchy who had failed to grasp the importance of using tanks in
mass-attacks with air support.
When the German Army broke through at Sedan he was given
command of the recently formed 4th Armoured Division. With 200 tanks, de Gaulle
attacked the German panzers at Montcornet on 17th May, 1940. Lacking air
support, de Gaulle made little impact on halting the German advance.
De Gaulle was more successful at Caumont (28th May) when he
became the only French commanding officer to force the Germans to retreat
during the German Invasion of France.
On the 5th June, 1940, the French prime minister, Paul
Reynaud, sacked Edouard Daladier and appointed de Gaulle as his minister of
war. De Gaulle also visited London but when he returned to France on 16th June
he discovered the Henri-Philippe Petain had ousted Paul Reynaud as premier and
was forming a government that would seek an armistice with Germany.
In danger of being arrested by the new French government, de
Gaulle returned to England. The following day he made a radio broadcast calling
for French people to continue fighting against the German Army.
Whereas as President Franklin D. Roosevelt in the USA
recognized Vichy France Winston Churchill refused and backed de Gaulle as
leader of the "Free French". Henri-Philippe Petain responded by
denouncing de Gaulle. On 4th July, 1940, a court-martial in Toulouse sentenced
him in absentia to four years in prison. At a second court-martial on 2nd
August, 1940, sentenced him to death.
De Gaulle made attempts to unify the resistance movements in
France. In March 1943 Jean Moulin, Charles Delestraint and Andre Dewavrin
managed to unite eight major resistance movements under de Gaulle's leadership.
However, this good work was undermined when in June, 1943, both Delestraint and
Moulin were both arrested by the Gestapo.
On 30th May 1943, de Gaulle moved to Algeria. The following
month the French Committee of National Liberation (FCNL) was established with
de Gaulle and Henri Giraud as co-presidents. De Gaulle had difficulty working
with his co-president and by July, 1943, had limited Giraud's power to command
of the armed forces.
Franklin D. Roosevelt and Winston Churchill were furious
when de Gaulle's announced on 26 May, 1944, that the FCNL will now be known as
the Provisional Government of the French Republic. Roosevelt and Churchill
refused to recognize de Gaulle's action and decided to exclude him from the
planning of Operation Overlord.
Despite objections from Britain and the USA, De Gaulle's
Provisional Government was recognized by Czechoslovakia, Poland, Belgium,
Luxembourg, Yugoslavia and Norway. On 13th July, 1944, the governments of
Britain and the USA also agreed that de Gaulle could help administer the
liberated portions of France.
De Gaulle reached France from Algiers on 20th August 1944.
De Gaulle and his 2nd Armoured Division was allowed to join the USA Army when
it entered Paris on 25th August. At a public speech later that day he announced
that the French Forces of the Interior (FFI) would be integrated into the
French Army and the militia would be dissolved. He also offered posts in his
government to leaders of the resistance.
Those who took office included Georges Bidault, Henry Frenay
and Charles Tillon. De Gaulle was upset by not being invited to the Yalta
Conference but he was allowed to represent France as one of the four countries
to sign the final instrument of surrender with Germany. France was also given
one of the four occupation zones in Germany.
On 13th November, 1945, the first Constituent Assembly
unanimously elected de Gaulle as head of the French government. He held the
post until resigning on 20th January, 1946. He then formed the right-wing
group, the Rally of the French People (RFP). After initial success it declined
in popularity and de Gaulle left it in 1953 and it was disbanded two years
later.
After his retirement from politics de Gaulle wrote the first
three volumes of his memoirs. He returned to politics in 1958 when he was
elected president during the Algerian crisis. He granted independence to all 13
French African colonies but the Algerian War continued until 1962.
De Gaulle decided that France should have its own atom bomb
and repeatedly blocked Britain's attempts to join the European Economic
Community. In 1966 de Gaulle withdrew France from the integrated military
command of NATO.
Following student riots against his government and negative
results in a referendum, de Gaull resigned from office in April, 1969. In
retirement he completed his memoirs. Charles De Gaulle died on 9th November,
1970.
Primary Sources
Main Article
(1) General Charles de Gaulle, attempted to halt the German
invasion of France at Abbeville. He wrote about these events in his book, The
Call to Honour (1955) By the evening (28th May, 1940) the objective was
reached. Only Mont Caubert still held out. There were a great many dead from
both sides on the field. Our tanks had been sorely tried. Barely a hundred were
still in working order. But all the same, an atmosphere of victory hovered over
the battlefield. Everyone held his head high. The wounded were smiling. The
guns fired gaily. Before us, in a pitched battle, the Germans had retired.
Alas! In the course of the Battle of France, what other
ground had been or would be won, except this strip of fourteen kilometres deep?
If the State had played its part; if, while there was time, it had directed its
military system towards enterprise, not passivity; if our leaders had in
consequence had at their disposal the instruments for shock and manoeuvre which
had been often suggested to the politicians and to the High Command; then our
arms would have had their chance, and France would have found her soul again.
(2) Robert Boothby, Boothby: Recollections of a Rebel (1978)
Within hours of the French capitulation, Louis Spears invited me to lunch to
meet what he called 'a French Brigadier whom I have just brought over from
Bordeaux. The Brigadier was de Gaulle; and the lunch party consisted of Spears,
his wife (Mary Borden), de Gaulle, Mme. de Gaulle, and myself.
Spears told us about their flight, how they had run out of
petrol and had to make a forced landing in the Channel Islands with two minutes
to spare. De Gaulle, who was going to make a broadcast that night, told us that
he thought of saying: "France has lost a battle, but not the war." We
all thought that this was very good. Later on Spears and de Gaulle quarrelled
bitterly when Spears was head of a British Mission to the Levant, and tried -
rightly - to ease the French out of Syria and the Lebanon.
There is no doubt that, in addition to being a brave soldier
and, with Liddell Hart, the most brilliant military historian of our time,
Spears was a natural intriguer.
What is equally beyond doubt is that, if he had not pulled
de Gaulle into that aeroplane at Bordeaux, de Gaulle would never have been
heard of. Spears, and Spears alone, created de Gaulle; and in so doing made
history. De Gaulle knew it, and resented it. When Spears took him to see
Churchill, the latter said: "Why have you brought this lanky, gloomy
Brigadier?" Spears replied: "Because no one else would come."
(3) General Charles de Gaulle, BBC radio broadcast (18th
June, 1940) I, General de Gaulle, now in London, call on all French officers
and men who are at present on British soil, or may be in the future, with or
without their arms; I call on all engineers and skilled workmen from the
armaments factories who are at present on British soil, or may be in the
future, to get in touch with me. Whatever happens, the flame of the French resistance
must not and shall not die.
(4) General Charles de Gaulle, wrote about Lend-Lease in his
book, The Call to Honour (1955)
On March 9th, at dawn, Mr. Churchill came and woke up to
tell me, literally dancing with joy, that the American Congress had passed the
"Lend-Lease Bill," which had been under discussion for several weeks.
There was, indeed, matter of comfort here for us, not only from the fact that
the belligerents were from now on assured of receiving from the United States
the material necessary for fighting, but also because America, by becoming, in
Roosevelt's phrase, "the arsenal of the democracies," was taking a
gigantic step toward war.
(5) General Charles de Gaulle, The Call to Honour (1955)
Jean Moulin was dropped by parachute in France during the night of January 1st.
He carried credentials from me appointing him as my delegate for the
non-occupied zone of Metropolitan France and instructing him to endure unity of
action among the elements of the resistance there. This would mean that his
authority would not, in principle, be disputed. It was therefore agreed that it
was he who would be the centre of our communications in France, first with the
South Zone, then, as soon as possible, with the North Zone
(6) General Charles de Gaulle, The Call to Honour (1955)
Churchill had made for himself a rule to do nothing important except in
agreement with Roosevelt. Though he felt, more than any other Englishman, the
awkwardness of Washington's methods, though he found it hard to bear the
conditions of subordination in which United States aid placed the British
Empire, and though he bitterly resented the tone of supremacy which the
President adopted towards him, Churchill had decided, once for all, to bow to
the imperious necessity of the American alliance.
(7) Winston Churchill, letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt (16th
December, 1941) The German setback in Russia, the British successes in Libya,
the moral and military collapse of Italy, above all the the declarations of war
exchanged between Germany and the United States, must strongly affect the mind
of France and the French Empire. Now is the time to offer to Vichy and to
French North Africa a blessing or a cursing. A blessing will consist in a
promise by the United States and great Britain to re-establish France as a Great
Power with her territories undiminished.
Our relations with General de Gaulle and the Free French
movement will require to be reviewed. Hitherto the United States have entered
into no undertakings similar to those comprised in my correspondence with him.
Through no particular fault of his own movement has created new antagonism in
French minds. Any action which the united states may now feel able to take in
regard to him should have the effect, inter alia, of redefining our obligations
to him and France so as to make these obligations more closely dependent upon
the eventual effort by him and the French nation to rehabilitate themselves.
(8) James F. Byrnes, as Secretary of State, attended the
Yalta Conference on 4th February, 1945.
In the fall of 1944 the Soviet Union and the Provisional
Government of France had entered into a treaty of friendship. It was
immediately obvious at Yalta, however, that the treaty and the friendly words
exchanged over it by the diplomats had not changed in any degree Marshal
Stalin's opinion on the contribution of France to the war. He thought France
should play little part in the control of Germany, and stated that Yugoslavia
and Poland were more entitled to consideration than France.
When Roosevelt and Churchill proposed that France be
allotted a zone of occupation, Stalin agreed. But it was clear he agreed only
because the French zone was to be taken out of the territory allotted to the
United States and the United Kingdom. And he especially opposed giving France a
representative on the Allied Control Council for Germany. He undoubtedly
concurred in the opinion expressed to the President by Mr. Molotov that this
should be done "only as a kindness to France and not because she is
entitled to it."
"I am in favor of France being given a zone,"
Stalin declared, "but I cannot forget that in this war France opened the
gates to the enemy." He maintained it would create difficulties to give
France a zone of occupation and a representative on the Allied Control Council
and refuse the same treatment to others who had fought more than France. He
said France would soon demand that de Gaulle attend the Big Three's
Conferences.
Churchill argued strongly in favor of France's being
represented on the Council. He said the British public would not understand if
questions affecting France and the French zone were settled without her participation
in the discussion. It did not follow, as Stalin had suggested, that France
would' demand de Gaulle's participation in the conferences of the Big Three, he
added. And, in his best humor, Mr. Churchill said the conference was "a
very exclusive club, the entrance fee being at least five million soldiers or
the equivalent."
(9) Harold Macmillan, speech in the House of Commons (31st
July 1961) Therefore, after long and earnest consideration, Her Majesty's
Government have come to the conclusion that it would be right for Britain to
make a formal application under Article 237 of the Treaty for negotiations with
a view to joining the Community if satisfactory arrangements can be made to
meet the special needs of the United Kingdom, of the Commonwealth and of the
European Free Trade Association.
If, as I earnestly hope, our offer to enter into
negotiations with the European Economic Community is accepted, we shall spare
no efforts to reach a satisfactory agreement. These negotiations must
inevitably be of a detailed and technical character, covering a very large
number of the most delicate and difficult matters. They may, therefore, be
protracted and there can, of course, be no guarantee of success. When any
negotiations are brought to a conclusion then it will be the duty of the
Government to recommend to the House what course we should pursue.
(10) Charles De Gaulle, speech (4th January 1963) The Treaty
of Rome was concluded between six continental States - States which are,
economically speaking, one may say, of the same nature. Indeed, whether it be a
matter of their industrial or agricultural production, their external
exchanges, their habits or their commercial clientele, their living or working
conditions, there is between them much more resemblance than difference.
Moreover, they are adjacent, they inter-penetrate, they prolong each other
through their communications. It is therefore a fact to group them and to link
them in such a way that what they have to produce, to buy, to sell, to consume
- well, they do produce, buy, sell, consume, in preference in their own
ensemble. Doing that is conforming to realities.
Moreover, it must be added that from the point of view of
their economic development, their social progress, their technical capacity,
they are, in short, keeping pace. They are marching in similar fashion. It so
happens, too, that there is between them no kind of political grievance, no
frontier question, no rivalry in domination or power. On the contrary, they are
joined in solidarity, especially and primarily, from the aspect of the consciousness
they have, of defining together an important part of the sources of our
civilisation; and also as concerns their security, because they are continentals
and have before them one and the same menace from one extremity to the other of
their territories; finally, they are in solidarity through the fact that not
one among them is bound abroad by any particular political or military accord.
Thus, it was psychologically and materially possible to make
an economic community of the Six, though not without difficulties. When the
Treaty of Rome was signed in 1957, it was after long discussions; and when it
was concluded, it was necessary in order to achieve something that we French
put in order our economic, financial, and monetary affairs and that was done in
1959.
Thereupon Great Britain posed her candidature to the Common
Market. She did it after having earlier refused to participate in the
communities we are now building, as well as after creating a free trade area
with six other States, and, finally, after having - I may well say it, the
negotiations held at such length on this subject will be recalled - after
having put some pressure on the Six to prevent a real beginning being made in
the application of the Common Market. If England asks in turn to enter, but on
her own conditions, this poses without doubt to each of the six States, and
poses to England, problems of a very great dimension.
England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked
through her exchanges, her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and
often the most distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial and
commercial activities, and only slight agricultural ones. She has in all her
doings very marked and very original habits and traditions.
(11) Paul-Henri Spaak, The Continuing Battle: Memories of an
European (1971) A new political event of extreme importance was in the making:
General de Gaulle had torpedoed our negotiations without having warned either
his partners or the British. He had acted with a lack of consideration
unexampled in the history of the EEC, showing utter contempt for his negotiating
partners, allies and opponents alike. He had brought to a halt negotiations
which he himself put in train in full agreement with his partners, and had done
so on the flimsiest of pretexts.
What had happened? There is every reason to believe that it
was the attitude adopted by Macmillan at his meeting with Kennedy in Bermuda
which so upset the President of the French Republic. Macmillan's crime was to
have reached agreement with the President of the United States on Britain's
nuclear, weaponry. He had in fact arranged for the purchase of Polaris missiles
from the United States. In General de Gaulle's eyes the cooperation with the
Americans was tantamount to treason against Europe's interests and justified
his refusal to allow Britain into the Common Market.
The General's resentment was all the greater because a few
days before the Bermuda meeting he had received Macmillan at Rambouillet. The
British Prime Minister, he claimed, had told him nothing of his nuclear plans.
On the other hand, de Gaulle gave Macmillan no warning that he was about to
torpedo the negotiations in Brussels. I think the full truth about these events
still remains to be told. The French and British versions which have been
circulating in the chancelleries differ, but what is certain is that France,
without consulting her partners, unilaterally withdrew from negotiations to
which she had earlier agreed and that she did so, moreover, after first
insisting that the Six must present a united front.
We were faced with a complete volte-face. Stunned and angry,
our first reaction was to ignore what had been said in Paris and to continue
the negotiation as if nothing had happened. The British showed extraordinary
sang-froid. Though, deep down, they were greatly shocked, they gave no outward
sign of this and continued to present their arguments at the negotiating table
with imperturbable calm.
(12) Charles De Gaulle, speech (4th January 1963) I should
like to speak particularly about the objection to integration. People counter
this by saying: "Why not merge the six states together into a single
supranational entity? That would be very simple and practical". But such
an entity is impossible to achieve in the absence in Europe today of a federator
who has the necessary power, reputation and ability. Thus one has to fall back
on a sort of hybrid arrangement under which the six states agree to submit to
the decisions of a qualified majority. At the same time, although there are
already six national Parliaments as well as the European Parliament and, in
addition the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe... it would be
necessary to elect over and above this, yet a further Parliament, described as
European, which would lay down the law to the six states.
These are ideas that might appeal to certain minds but I
entirely fail to see how they could be put into practice, even with six
signatures at the foot of a document. Can we imagine France, Germany, Italy,
the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg being prepared on a matter of importance
to them in the national or international sphere, to do something that appeared
wrong to them, merely because others had ordered them to do so? Would the peoples
of France, of Germany, of Italy, of the Netherlands, of Belgium or of
Luxembourg ever dream of submitting to laws passed by foreign parliamentarians
if such laws ran counter to their deepest convictions? Clearly not. It is
impossible nowadays for a foreign majority to impose their will on reluctant
nations. It is true, perhaps, that in this 'integrated' Europe as it is called
there might be no policy at all.
This would simplify a grea many things. Indeed, once there
was no France, no Europe; once there was no policy - since one could not be
imposed on each of the six states, attempts to formulate a policy would cease.
But then, perhaps, these peoples would follow in the wake of some outsider who
had a policy. There would, perhaps, be a federator, but he would not be European.
And Europe would not be an integrated Europe but something vaster by far and, I
repeat, with a federator. Perhaps to some extent it is this that at times
inspires the utterances of certain advocates of European integration. If so,
then it would be better to say so.
Charles de Gaulle
Website developed by Peter McMillan
© Spartacus Educational Publishers Ltd Website developed by
Peter McMillan
Post A Comment:
0 comments: